Identity and Legitimacy Transformations in Iran: Potential Implications for Relations with Israel
Introduction
Iranian–Israeli relations cannot be understood through security calculations alone. As this paper argues, the relationship is rooted in deeper structures involving political identity, sources of legitimacy, and the role of religion in the official discourse of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Since the 1979 Revolution, Iranian foreign policy has become more than an extension of traditional state interests; it has been linked to a religious and revolutionary narrative that views opposition to Israel as part of the regime’s political self-definition.
However, this official narrative does not necessarily reflect Iranian society as a whole. Iran is a nation characterized by ethnic, cultural, and religious diversity, and a growing gap exists between the state as a religious–revolutionary authority and broad segments of society seeking alternative civic, national, or cultural identities. This raises an important question: Can intellectual and religious transformations within Iranian society reshape the foundations of state legitimacy and gradually influence Iran’s stance toward Israel?
Political Legitimacy Between Religion, Revolution, and Institutions
The legitimacy of the Iranian system rests on the interaction of three elements: religion, revolution, and institutions. Religion provides the government with theological and symbolic authority; the revolution supplies a historical narrative centered on the overthrow of the Shah; and institutions provide the framework of statehood and continuity of governance. This combination has intertwined domestic and foreign policy with a symbolic structure that often portrays political opponents as moral and religious adversaries as well.
Within this framework, hostility toward Israel does not appear merely as a diplomatic disagreement. Rather, it functions as a component of the regime’s broader legitimacy structure. The existence of an “external enemy” helps mobilize domestic support, explain crises, and reinforce the image of the state as the bearer of a mission that transcends national borders. Yet the persistence of this structure does not necessarily imply enduring public support. Protests, declining trust in religious institutions, and growing rejection of certain regional policies all suggest that state legitimacy is no longer received by society in the same way as before.
Iranian Society Is Not a Monolith
One of the most common mistakes in analyzing Iran, according to this paper, is treating it as a homogeneous religious and political entity. Iranian society carries a Persian historical memory, multiple national experiences, religious and sectarian diversity, and a long history of engagement with the wider world. Consequently, official anti-Israel rhetoric does not eliminate the existence of alternative social currents, some of which believe that Iran’s priorities should be domestic rather than regional.
This divide has become visible in protest slogans emphasizing “Iran first” and rejecting the allocation of national resources to external conflicts. It has also appeared through growing criticism of religious institutions and increasing skepticism among younger generations regarding the ability of official religious discourse to represent them. These developments do not necessarily indicate an immediate political transformation, but they do suggest the emergence of a social foundation capable of redefining the relationship between identity, legitimacy, and foreign policy.
Religion as an Interactive Factor in the Conflict
In the Iranian context, religion is not merely a rhetorical tool but an integral part of political architecture. Religious and historical symbols are frequently invoked to shape attitudes toward Israel and to frame the conflict as a moral struggle extending beyond immediate political interests. This dimension helps explain why Iranian policy cannot always be reduced to pragmatic calculations alone.
At the same time, the religious dimension may also contain alternative possibilities if detached from political instrumentalization. Historical memories of Persian–Jewish relations, along with perceived similarities in experiences of suffering and displacement, may provide a basis for cultural and humanitarian narratives different from the language of official hostility. For this reason, the paper suggests that fostering a new understanding between Iranian and Jewish communities could become one avenue for reducing tensions over the long term.
Potential Scenarios
The paper outlines four primary future scenarios:
1. Continued Confrontation
The Iranian regime continues portraying Israel as a symbol of evil, while Israel continues to engage primarily with the ruling authorities rather than Iranian society. This scenario preserves existing tensions and creates opportunities for other regional actors to exploit the conflict.
2. Rhetorical Change Without Structural Change
The intensity of public rhetoric may decline without any meaningful transformation in the underlying dynamics of the conflict. This path may be misleading because it creates an impression of de-escalation while leaving the root causes of tension untouched.
3. Temporary Pragmatism
Both sides may reach limited understandings or temporary arrangements driven by practical interests. However, such arrangements are likely to remain fragile unless the deeper ideological and religious foundations of the conflict are addressed.
4. Redefinition of Identity and Legitimacy
This represents the most transformative scenario. It would involve a decline in the regime’s monopoly over defining Iranian identity and the emergence of a broader social consciousness that views relations with Jews and Israel through cultural, historical, and humanitarian perspectives rather than ideological hostility. Success in this direction could reduce the likelihood of escalation and limit the ability of regional actors to exploit the conflict for their own purposes.
Political Implications
One of the paper’s central arguments is the importance of distinguishing between the Iranian regime and Iranian society. Treating the entire population through a single political lens may alienate social groups that could otherwise be engaged constructively. A more nuanced understanding of Iran’s ethnic, sectarian, and social diversity allows for a more effective approach to security and stability.
The paper further argues that strategic opportunities do not lie solely in military or security policies. They also exist in the development of cultural, media, and political initiatives that encourage long-term engagement with Iranian society and with communities that do not perceive Israel as an existential enemy. Such efforts may include protecting minorities, rejecting collective punishment, and avoiding the conflation of peoples with governments, or sects with ethnic groups.
Additionally, the paper warns that ignoring internal developments within Iran may leave space for other regional actors to manipulate the conflict in pursuit of their own interests. Therefore, any effective policy toward Iran should combine security vigilance with cultural understanding, investment in people-to-people relations, and resistance to simplistic narratives that divide the region into rigid categories of “enemy” and “ally.”
Conclusion
The paper concludes that official Iranian hostility toward Israel is not an immutable reality arising from Iranian society as a whole. Rather, it is a product of a religious–revolutionary legitimacy structure that emerged after 1979. As the gap between state and society widens, opportunities emerge for rethinking the relationship on different foundations.
Understanding Iran as a diverse society rather than merely a political regime opens the door to a more realistic and nuanced approach. Engagement with Iranian society, recognition of historical and cultural connections with the Jewish people, and careful distinction between genuine security threats and entire populations may become essential components of a long-term strategy aimed at reducing tensions, promoting stability, and preventing regional actors from exploiting the conflict for their own agendas.
In this sense, the paper does not offer naïve optimism. Rather, it calls for a deeper examination of the sources of legitimacy and identity within Iran. Intellectual, religious, and social transformations are not merely internal matters; they are forces capable of reshaping Iran’s external behavior and opening new possibilities for a different vision of relations with Israel and the wider region.
Zion Peace Union